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The ethics of waste policy
Wallimann-Helmer, Ivo
Abstract: One of the major ethical issues in waste policy concerns the just distribution of waste facilities
and the associated environmental risks. This essay provides an overview of the most important aspects to
consider when assessing whether unequal exposure to waste facilities is unjust. It claims that the ethical
principles that might warrant such injustices are problematic due to feasibility constraints. This is why
appropriate democratic involvement in policy decisions about waste facilities is crucial. However, equal
recognition of all affected is given only if they all can have an effective and equal voice in policy-making
about waste facilities.
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pleasure to be able to dedicate this volume to him.
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Is public policy ethics possible and, if so, is it desirable? This twofold question can – and some-
times does – elicit a smile or a frown. The smile implies that ethical theorising rests on a naïve 
idea of policy-making; the frown implies that there is something tasteless or incongruous in 
expecting philosophy to engage with problems of policy, and with the political bargaining and 
compromise that policy-making involves.1 These reactions – familiar to many working in this 
academic discipline – point to the ways in which ethics and public policy have been taken to 
be separate areas of practical concern and theoretical inquiry.
For some philosophers, the very idea of public policy ethics rests on a category mistake, 
confusing proper reflection on moral ideals with thinking about what is practically feasible. 
Gerald Gaus’s qualms that ‘participation in public controversy masked as philosophy corrupts 
philosophy’ captures this worry well, reflecting the anxiety that ‘a sophisticated, rational, ideo-
logical advocacy is conducted as if it were philosophy, giving the impression (both to ourselves 
and our students) that philosophy is merely an intellectual game in which you defend what 
you want to believe’ (Gaus 2005: 67). Public policy ethics, on this account, diverts the moral 
philosopher from doing philosophically relevant work and downgrades ethical theorising to the 
level of wishy-washy opinion and rhetorical hot air.2 The worry, of course, is that the only way 
for philosophers to gain the ear of policy-makers is to betray the commitment to the reasoned 
evaluation of abstract arguments that defines philosophical ethics in the first place. In short, 
public policy ethics is no ethics at all – or so the argument for policy-free ethics implies.
Other philosophers occasionally point to the fact that the rubber of ethical theory never 
quite meets the road of policy. The contention here is that proper ethical reflection rarely plays 
more than a minor or decorative role in the actual policy-making process. One of the reasons 
for this alleged disconnect between ethics and public policy is that moral philosophy is not the 
kind of material that typically matters for policy work. Jonathan Wolff (2011) comes close to 
this position when he notes that it is not so much the philosophical quality of an argument that 
informs policy as the philosopher’s ability to play the language game of the policy status quo.3 
Wolff notes that ‘it is very rare for a policy to have been introduced for clear and principled 
reasons’, which means that ‘to have any effect on immediate policy, philosophers will have to 
swallow hard and accept that the discussion will often have to take place within the terms and 
space set by political and pragmatic concerns’ (80). Following this reading, rigorous ethical 
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theorising as currently practised often fails to capture the real concerns of actual policy-makers, 
thus raising the spectre of irrelevance for public policy ethics as a distinct discipline.
Public policy experts have their own versions of these concerns. After all, if policy analysis 
is a scientific pursuit, with its own standards for success, philosophical analysis will seem at best 
like unnecessary hand-waving, and at worst, like a distraction from the work to be done. This 
might explain why, as Henry Shue remarked (2006: 709), experts in public policy often treat 
‘specialists on ethics or normative issues’ as unfortunate additions to the main event, ‘like the 
wilted salad that comes whether requested or not’ with one’s meal, or as matters of taste, to be 
taken or left, ‘like the pepper that is entirely optional’. Worse still, philosophy can sometimes 
seem like a threat to public policy, encouraging us to focus on the desirable rather than the prac-
ticable, and, in a famous phrase, making ‘the perfect the enemy of the good’. Hence, students are 
encouraged carefully to distinguish policy analysis – which is about ‘learning why governments 
do what they do and what the consequences of their actions are’ through ‘the tools of systematic 
inquiry’ – with policy advocacy, which is about ‘saying what governments ought to do’ using ‘the 
skills of rhetoric, persuasion, organization and activism’ (Dye 1981: 6–7). Since, by definition, 
ethics deals with oughts, this widely taught view of public policy tends to equate policy ethics 
with the promotion of partisan agendas and ideological advocacy. Thus, those working in ethics 
and public policy can feel like an unloved child, disparaged and disowned by its parents.
Other familiar concerns with public policy ethics reflect the fact that public policy is a 
political activity, and espouse the belief that politics is fundamentally amoral. Such a separation 
of ethics and policy draws on familiar images of politicians and public officials as Machiavel-
lian creatures, who must be willing to set their moral scruples aside, and to ‘dirty their hands’, 
climbing ‘the greasy pole’ of power, in order to achieve their objectives. Couched in the 
language of Weber, rather than Machiavelli, good politicians and apt public officials must be 
concerned with the choice of means to given ends, and not with the evaluation of ends. It is not 
for them to ‘turn the other cheek’, nor to pursue the ‘ethics of conviction’,4 however permis-
sible, even admirable, such behaviour may be in private life.
Now, if politics were really amoral, there would be little point in examining the moral 
principles that should guide it, however enjoyable it might be to play a parlour game called 
‘imagining the good polity’ or ‘choosing principles of social justice’. Some moralists might rel-
ish arguing among themselves about where, how far, and why our actual world departs from 
the ideal. But were politics and, with it, policy-making, reducible to a scramble for power and 
influence, it is hard to see why most people should interest themselves in ethical arguments 
about policy. Perhaps morality might have a place in private life – or those spaces for personal 
choice and action that happen to be free from political struggles – but to suppose that public 
policy might be subject to ethical reflection, choice, and control would seem delusional at best, 
and manipulative and deceptive at worst.
However, many people reject such amoral views of politics as incoherent and reductive, and 
accept that a normative approach to politics can be helpful, and even desirable. Thus, there has 
been a veritable explosion in normative political philosophy since the 1970s and the pathbreak-
ing work of analytic political philosophers, such as John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald 
Dworkin, of critical theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, and feminist phi-
losophers, such as Iris Marion Young, Nancy Fraser, and Anne Phillips.5 Yet, until recently, 
this explosion had produced no systematic interest in ethics and public policy. Indeed, it is only 
very recently that a debate has started to take place on the distinctive methods, if any, of ethics 
and public policy, and the different approaches, styles, or ways in which it might be developed. 
However, to date, there is no collective publication – handbook or otherwise – on the current 
state of the discipline.6
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It is not that moral, political, or legal philosophers do not engage in ethical discussions of 
public policy, or that they are never asked to participate in public inquiries on matters of con-
troversy. On the contrary, we can think of the contributions of Bernard Williams on obscenity, 
Mary Warnock and Onora O’Neill on bioethics, Salvatore Veca on ‘Feeding the Planet’, or 
the contributions of Jürgen Habermas, Ronald Dworkin, Charles Taylor, and Amartya Sen to 
see that philosophers play an important public role.7 Indeed, several contributors to this volume 
have been involved in public commissions, or in policy-making bodies concerned with public 
health, education, and security. Nonetheless, the dominant approach to ethics and public pol-
icy, until recently, has seemed to be more concerned with ‘sex, drugs, and rock and roll’ than 
with the ethics of public policy as most politicians, policy-makers, civil servants, and citizens 
understand or experience it. Thus, publications and teaching on ethics and policy would centre 
on popular controversy around prostitution, abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia, recreational 
drug use, pornography, and ‘hate speech’ – all seen, correctly, as meriting normative attention, 
but treated as though they had nothing much to do with more mundane and less contentious 
issues.
Interesting and important though such discussions have been, for philosophers as for other 
people, this traditional approach to ethics and public policy suffers from two problems. The 
first is that a focus on the more sensational issues reinforces the idea that ‘ordinary’ matters 
of policy raise no interesting or complex ethical questions in themselves, and none that need 
affect our approach to abortion, euthanasia, or free speech. But as feminists and disability activ-
ists have insisted, we cannot easily separate the assumptions about the value of life or the best 
way to  distinguish public and private matters when it comes to the regulation of sexuality or 
speech from those that shape our practices of security, health care, education, and transport.8 In 
addition, a focus on ‘sexy’ topics plays into an idea of public ethics as merely an extension, or 
application of, familiar moral theories, rather than as a subject which may lead us to rethink our 
moral categories, conceptual distinctions, and normative approaches.
Our collection, therefore, adopts a perspective on ethics and public policy which is at once 
broader, and narrower, than is usual. It is broader, because we wanted to bring together work 
on the ethical dimensions of public policy spanning issues of domestic and international poli-
tics, intergenerational politics, and such ordinary or technical, but nonetheless central, topics 
as the siting of nuclear waste, the ethics of taxation, and policies on disability and poverty. 
Ideally, we would have loved to have had chapters examining the ethical dimensions of every 
policy issue as instantiated in current governmental practice – but that, of course, would have 
been overwhelming, as well as impossible. So, instead, we tried to focus our attention on the 
breadth of work that is now being done in ethics and public policy in order to highlight the 
range and quality of research in the area, and to illuminate the ethical dimensions of public 
policy that many of us – the editors included – have never considered and have no idea how 
to handle.
Nevertheless, if our collection is very much broader in its conception of ethics and public 
policy than is usual, it is narrower in its focus on one important dimension. Following theorists 
such as Dennis F. Thompson, Jonathan Wolff, and Richard Bellamy, we take the political 
dimensions of policy-making to play an important role in determining the ethical content, 
dynamics, and types of justification that can be offered for public policy.9 Moreover, because 
that content and those justifications will depend on whether we think of people as political 
equals, and on the forms of freedom, well-being, and opportunity which that equality requires, 
permits, or forbids, we focus explicitly on issues of ethics and public policy that arise as a result 
of democratic political struggles and ideals, and that can be resolved domestically and interna-
tionally in ways consistent with democratic government.
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It is not that undemocratic governments are of no interest to us, nor that they cannot 
improve our understanding of morality and politics. Given that democratic societies are imper-
fect in many ways, as is our understanding of democratic values and institutions, it would be 
absurd to cut ourselves off from potential sources of knowledge based on current ideas about 
what is, and is not, democratic. However, for practical and for philosophical reasons, we believe 
it best to centre this collection on problems of ethics and public policy that arise in democra-
cies, and on democratically-informed or democratically-sensitive principles, broadly conceived. 
Practically, we hope that this will give our collection a substantive coherence and a methodo-
logical focus that it might otherwise lack, given the breadth of its subject matter. We also hope 
that it might provide some consistency of factual and normative assumptions across chapters 
dealing with very different moral and political problems.
Philosophically, this selection on the basis of democratic considerations reflects our con-
viction that ethics and public policy can no more adopt ‘the view from nowhere’ than other 
branches of philosophy, but need not therefore be limited to the presentation and evaluation of 
‘the way we do things around here’, to borrow a famous phrase from Richard Rorty.10 Instead, 
we hope that combining the ethical evaluation of policy with democratic theory and practice, 
quite broadly understood, will enable our collection to speak to all those for whom the right to 
participate in the government of one’s society is an essential right, and a defeasible constraint on 
the legitimacy of any government.11
Democracies are quite varied political arrangements, and the adjective ‘democratic’ can be 
applied to associations, individuals, institutions, and ideals. Nonetheless, democratic govern-
ments are committed to the belief that all citizens are, in principle, entitled to participate in 
government, and this makes democracies different from other forms of government, in which 
wealth, virtue, sex, religion, or parentage is thought to justify limiting political participation to a 
few, select, individuals. Importantly, for our purposes, it means that democracies cannot evalu-
ate public policies purely on the assumption that citizens are the subjects of government, or the 
objects of government policy. In addition – and this is a distinctive implication of democratic 
government – ethical evaluation has to consider the effects of policy on citizens as governors, 
or potential governors, of their society and, therefore, the consequences of policy on people’s 
ability to see themselves as active participants in government rather than passive beneficiaries of 
public policy.12 Hence, democracies must find ways of selecting people for positions of power 
and influence that reflect democratic ideas about political ends and means, as opposed to theo-
cratic, aristocratic, plutocratic, or epistocratic ones.
The ethics of public policy in a democratic society involves meeting at least two important 
constraints that other societies might avoid. The first is that, in its design and implementation, 
public policy must reflect “equal respect and concern” for citizen’s well-being and rights, to 
borrow Ronald Dworkin’s fortunate phrase.13 The second is that it must also protect and foster 
people’s capacities to share in the process of governing, however that process is conceived. 
Hence, as this collection shows, while democratic government comes in many forms, reflect-
ing different political ideals, circumstances, and needs, the differences between democratic and 
undemocratic government provide a fruitful lens for envisaging the ethics of public policy and 
may, on occasion, be necessary, not merely useful.
Our aim is not to replace the currently contending moralities of utility, liberal rights, repub-
lican virtue, contractualist counterfactuals, or care relationships with a distinct (and presumably 
preferable) democratic ethics. Rather, we seek to show that it can be morally illuminating and 
politically helpful to understand the constraints that democracy places on public ethics, regard-
less of whether those constraints differ markedly from those suggested by alternative ethical 
perspectives. To put it in slightly more technical terms, we aim to investigate how democratic 
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values, conceived as pro tanto or prima facie reasons for government action, might inform ethical 
reflection on public policy, bearing in mind that they may have little or no distinctive signifi-
cance in some cases.
There is no one favoured view of democracy that unites the 41 chapters of this Handbook. 
Authors were not asked to take a particular ‘line’, and they were selected, as far as possible, not 
just for their obvious expertise but also to reflect the geographical, professional, and personal 
variety of scholars working in the field. Collections of this sort tend to be dominated by scholars 
who are already well known. However, much new work in ethics and public policy is being 
done by relatively young scholars, for whom public ethics is central to their academic work, 
rather than being of sporadic interest, or an outgrowth of the more traditional philosophical 
concerns with which they are principally occupied. Thus, while the chapters in each part com-
plement each other and, we hope, provide an accessible introduction to recent work in ethics 
and public policy, they are written in different styles, and draw on the experience of different 
countries, and the ideas of different thinkers. Their effect is panoramic, as well as synthetic, in 
ways that defy simple summary.
Our refusal to commit to a specific view of democracy should hardly come as a surprise, 
given the extent of philosophical and political controversy about its nature and value. Even 
when different authors agree in their general normative positions about what democracy 
is, or ought to be, they nonetheless end up disagreeing on the exact implications that these 
positions have for particular public policies. Some of these disagreements emerge, we think, 
as a natural consequence of what Rawls calls the ‘burdens of judgment’ (Rawls 1996: 54),14 
an expression meant to capture the difficulties we confront in prioritising competing moral 
values and principles, the hard selection and weighing of complex evidential matters, or 
decisions about the least implausible instantiations of vague normative concepts. But disa-
greements will also arise because of the substantive variations across distinct policy areas and 
issues, even in cases where those areas and issues are contiguous or otherwise connected. As 
many of the chapters in this Handbook show, democratic commitments play out differently 
in different areas of policy – for example, in the area of warfare as compared to the field of 
foreign policy, and democracy does not direct us to the same kinds of decisions in the domain 
of waste disposal policies as it does when it comes to matters of climate change.15 Hence, our 
Handbook comprises different perspectives on democracy, as well as different facets of public 
policy.
The absence of a unifying democratic view is furthermore motivated by theoretical consid-
erations pertaining to the conceptual structure of democracy. Since the publication of Kenneth 
Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951, a rich literature has demonstrated the logical 
impossibility for any decision-making system to be simultaneously fully inclusive and pluralistic, 
respectful of majoritarian preferences, and collectively rational, although these are all demo-
cratic values, which we may want our institutions to realise.16 We have therefore encouraged 
our authors to focus on those democratic desiderata (if any) that seem most pertinent to the 
policy areas with which they are concerned. The result is a sequencing of the chapters that is 
meant to provide a helpful introduction to contemporary ethics and public policy, rather than 
tell a particular story about democracy.
Part I is dedicated to questions of methodology. It explores what it means to do public 
policy ethics today, raises questions about the contours and content of public policy ethics as 
a distinctive discipline, examines the ethical dimensions of cognate disciplines such as policy 
analysis and the place of policy ethics in the wider landscape of ethical theorising, and considers 
contrasting approaches to the place and role of philosophers in the public policy process, and 
the public arena more generally.
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Parts II, III, and IV cover various substantive areas of public policy. The parts mirror a quasi-
historical sequence in the theory and practice of public policy, starting from the basic idea that 
the public policy domain consists in whatever governments happen to be doing at any particular 
moment,17 while at the same time reflecting the changes in democratic policies and modes of 
government since the Second World War.18 Drawing on an analogy with Ian Hacking’s notion 
of ‘styles of reasoning’, one could see these three parts of the Handbook as instantiating differ-
ent styles of governing. For Hacking, it is characteristic of styles of reasoning that they ‘introduce 
new ways of being a candidate for truth and for falsehood’ (Hacking 1994: 42). Similarly, we 
take a style of governing to establish new dimensions whereby practical subject matters become 
matters of policy concern. Though styles of governing can change the substance or scope of 
various policy areas, styles are also about different ways of doing government that underlie, define, 
control, or revise what are considered to be the proper bounds and inner dynamic of the public 
policy domain.
Part II corresponds to a vision of government centred on the state’s de jure monopolising of 
some basic domestic functions, such as the organisation of domestic security, criminal justice, 
and education; the mediation of economic interests; and the regulation of finance as well as 
of military security in the international realm. Intuitively, these are policy areas which seem 
inseparable from the contemporary idea of government, the sine qua non of public policy.
Part III is concerned with a more expansive conception of government than the first, taking 
us from a mode of government tightly associated with the pouvoirs régaliens, as the French help-
fully describe them, to a vision of government as a privileged agent for securing the well-being 
of individuals, no matter the ascriptive and voluntary associations to which they otherwise 
belong. Government has a duty to prevent poverty and to help the poor but, beyond that, it 
has the responsibility to dismantle those social distinctions which keep people ‘in their place’ 
and make government the preserve of a privileged elite. Thus, the chapters in this third part 
are concerned with a mode of governing, as much as the content of actual policies – a mode 
which assumes that government has a special duty to foster social solidarity and inclusion, and 
to enable people to have an active say – for instance, via electoral participation – in the way 
that they are governed.
Part IV brings together a group of public policies concerned with both existential issues 
and questions of identity which, until recently, would have been the preserve of individuals, 
or of churches and other secondary associations, rather than of government. Thus, some of 
the policies in this part are concerned with the future existence, quality of life, and sustain-
ability of future citizens, as instantiated in the chapters on intergenerational justice, youth 
policies, new reproductive technologies, behavioural nudges, climate change, and waste poli-
cies. Others are concerned with the responsibilities of government, faced with the inevitable, 
albeit often unintended, effects of government on the civic and cultural identities of citizens, 
and on the social standing and respect for minority ethnic, racial, and religious groups. The 
chapters on citizenship tests, family reunification programs, language policies, and policies on 
religious diversity and accommodation reflect this strand of contemporary public policy, with 
its concern for the nature and identity of citizens, and with the existential choices and threats 
that they face.
We hope that this sequencing of chapters will make the Handbook easier for readers, be they 
practitioners, academics, students, or simply citizens interested in particular policies. The four 
parts are not meant to deploy a precise historical narrative – which would in any case be impos-
sible given the different political trajectories of contemporary democracies – and some chap-
ters could fit in more than one part. For instance, the chapter on education could have been 
included in Part III, the chapter on privacy and surveillance or the chapter on death policies in 
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Part IV, and the chapter on language policies or the one on religious accommodations could 
have been inserted in Part II. However, we hope that this ordering of the 41 chapters that make 
up this Handbook will benefit readers and facilitate future scholarly debate.19
Notes
 1 This is the position underlying much of the political realism about foreign policy defended by E.H. 
Carr or Hans Morgenthau. For an analysis of and reply to political realism, see Coady (2008).
 2 The tenet that practical ethics (and, with it, public policy ethics) is not philosophy proper can be traced 
back to Bertrand Russell, who equates it with preaching. In a 1944 text where he defends his emotivist 
meta-ethics against Buchler’s critique, Russell writes that “persuasion in ethical questions is necessarily 
different from persuasion in scientific matters. According to me, the person who judges that A is good is 
wishing others to feel certain desires. He will therefore, if not hindered by other activities, try to rouse 
these desires in other people if he thinks he knows how to do so. This is the purpose of preaching, and it 
was my purpose in the various books in which I have expressed ethical opinions”; in Russell (1999: 149).
 3 Wolff (2011) does not believe that the gap between philosophy and politics makes public policy ethics 
non-sensical or pointless, as both his book and his chapter in this collection reveal.
 4 Weber himself is more nuanced when he reflects on the relation between the “ethics of conviction” 
(which focuses on the morality of ends) and the “ethics of responsibility” (which concentrates on the 
morality of effective ends). In Politics as a Vocation he finds it ‘immeasurably moving when a mature 
human being (. . .) who feels the responsibility he bears for the consequences of his own actions with 
his entire soul and who acts in harmony with an ethics of responsibility reaches the point where he 
says, ‘Here I stand, I can do no other” ’. That is authentically human and cannot fail to move us. For 
this is a situation that may befall any of us at some point, if we are not inwardly dead. In this sense an 
ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility are not absolute antitheses but are mutually comple-
mentary, and only when taken together do they constitute the authentic human being who is capable 
of having a ‘vocation for politics’ ”; in Weber (2004: 92).
 5 For an interesting attempt at carving out a sui generis moral space for public policy and political activity, 
see also Palumbo and Bellamy (2010).
 6 There are, to be sure, quite a few public policy analysis handbooks, like the ones edited by Moran, 
Rein, and Goodin (2006), Peters and Pierre (2006), or Fischer, Miller, and Sidney (2007). Add to this 
the existence of a handbook that examines issues of administrative ethics (Cooper 2000, 2nd ed.), that 
of a handbook on the ethics of economics (Wilber 1997), that of a handbook of policy evaluation 
(Nagel 2002), that of a more general companion looking at global policy issues (Lawton, Van Der 
Wal, and Huberts 2015), and, finally, that of a collective publication that adopts a general philosophi-
cal approach to public policy (Gehring and Galston 2002). There is also a series of publications that 
focuses on the morality of particular public policy areas. These include: Aaron, Mann, and Taylor 
(1994); Preston and Sampford (2012); Little (2004); Kahn and Kasachkoff (2002); Bluhm and Heine-
man (2007); Stewart (2009); Boston, Bradstock, and Eng (2011); Bradstock, Eng, and Boston (2011); 
Wolff (2011); Weber (2011); Cohen (2014); Searing and Searing (2016). This indicates that public 
policy ethics is thriving, but in a state of disciplinary fragmentation that we wish to alleviate in and 
through this handbook.
 7 An abridged version of Williams’s report on obscenity and film censorship is available at https://
assets.cambridge.org/97811071/13770/frontmatter/9781107113770_frontmatter.pdf; a link to Mary 
Warnock’s 1978 report on special educational needs can be found here: www.educationengland.
org.uk/documents/warnock/, and the link to Warnock’s 1984 Report on Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology is available here: https://embryo.asu.edu/pages/report-committee-inquiry-human- 
fertilisation-and-embryology-1984-mary-warnock-and-committee; the 2007 Bouchard-Taylor report 
on ‘reasonable accommodation’ can be found at www.mce.gouv.qc.ca/publications/CCPARDC/
rapport-final-integral-en.pdf; the Report of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission on the Measure-
ment of Economic Performance and Social Progress is available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+Commission+report.
 8 See, in particular, MacKinnon (1997); Minow (1990); Roberts (1997; 2002), and Tremain (1999).
 9 See Thompson (1987), Palumbo and Bellamy (2010), and Wolff (2011).
 10 Rorty initially uses the phrase to deflate thick conceptions of objectivity and science, but he later 
extends it to (liberal) moral and political normativity as well. See Rorty (1991: 101). This comes close, 
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but differs from, Bernard Williams’s contention that liberalism is the way we make sense of political 
legitimacy “now and around here”; in Williams (2005: 7–12).
 11 Democratic legitimacy is defeasible in that there may be forms of undemocratic government which are 
properly considered legitimate. On this issue, see Rawls (2001b), Cohen (2009: 349–372), and Miller 
(2015: 177–192). Moreover, democratic governments may lose their legitimacy through such grave 
violations of human rights that citizens are released from their duty to obey. So even if it is reasonable 
to grant democracies a presumptive legitimacy that other forms of government lack, being democratic 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for legitimacy.
 12 In this respect, we find ourselves concurring with democratic approaches to public policy analysis, like 
the one formulated by Schneider and Ingram (1997), who describe policies that fail to involve ordinary 
citizens as degenerative processes.
 13 Dworkin (1977).
 14 Rawls (1971, 2001a).
 15 Thus, Christopher Kutz points to democracy working as a side-constraint on warfare, while Michael 
Blake focuses on equality and toleration as values that should be promoted via foreign policy.
 16 See, in particular, List (2011).
 17 On definitions of public policy, see, most notably, Dye (1972), and, for a useful recent discussion, Howl-
ett and Cashore (2014).
 18 We would like to thank Toon Kerkhoff, Frits van der Meer, Natascha van der Zwan, Alexandre 
Afonso, and Elena Bondarouk for useful discussions on this quasi-historical ordering.
 19 Another advantage of this normatively non-committal ordering is that it lends itself to multiple schol-
arly interpretations. For instance, one could read it as deploying a narrative about the metamorphosis 
of the state’s scope of action and intervention, moving from a watchman state (Part II) to a welfare 
state (Part III) to an enabling state (parts of Part III and Part IV). Alternatively, for those who might 
choose to assess the morality of public policy on the basis of a human rights standard, one could draw 
a rough parallel between our three parts and Karel Vasak’s (1977) famous division of human rights 
into three generations (civil and political, social and economic, and developmental human rights) or 
connect our ordering to the lively debates prompted by T.H. Marshall (1949/1950) about the state’s 
evolving responsibilities toward its citizens.
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THE ETHICS OF WASTE POLICY
Ivo Wallimann-Helmer
Introduction
Human beings produce waste, and this waste must be handled in some way or other. In mod-
ern societies, it is depolluted or recycled. Depollution and recycling of waste require facilities 
for reclaiming, incineration, or storage, such as aluminium processing plants, incinerators, and 
repositories for nuclear waste. For efficiency, technical, and security reasons, these facilities 
cannot be equally distributed across society. Ideally, however, their distribution would not lead 
to an unfair burdening for any social groups in society. The unjust distribution of waste facili-
ties was a major driver at the beginning of the environmental justice movement in the United 
States. Proponents of this movement found an unequal burdening of the socio-economically 
disadvantaged with waste facilities and landfills and argued that this was unjust. Since then, 
research on waste policy has most often been conducted within the framing of environmental 
justice. That is why this essay on the ethics of waste policy focuses on the environmental justice 
issues arising from waste facilities and associated risks. It is divided into four sections.
The bulk of research on environmental justice is empirical. The aim of this essay is to 
investigate its ethical implications. The first section provides an overview of the most impor-
tant aspects to consider when assessing whether inequalities in exposure to waste facilities are 
unjust. It explains the relevance of distinguishing between empirical findings and their ethical 
evaluation. At first sight, avoidable unequal burdening of the socio-economically disadvantaged 
seems to be unjust. The second section discusses how such an evaluation may be warranted and 
shows why it is often problematic for efficiency, technical, and security reasons. This is why 
policy issues about waste facilities should not only concern the fairness of their geographical dis-
tribution. The third section discusses the conditions of procedural justice – that is, democratic 
participation – in policy decisions about the siting of waste facilities and about compensation for 
increased environmental risks. Since appropriate involvement of all affected by a waste facility 
should play a crucial role in decisions about waste facilities, the essay closes with two challenges 
of inclusion. The first challenge concerns the conditions of equal citizenship, the second chal-
lenge the appropriate extension of the decision-making body.
While the first section is mainly concerned with conceptual issues, the three sections that fol-
low deal with three different kinds of justice considerations. In so doing, I follow Schlossberg, 
who claims that considerations of environmental justice can be divided into three categories 
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(Schlosberg, 2007): distributive justice, procedural justice, and justice as recognition. In the case 
of waste facilities, distributive justice concerns the geographical distribution of risks due to these 
facilities. In the environmental justice literature, procedural justice defines the fairness condi-
tions for the democratic processes of making policy decisions. Finally, justice as recognition 
aims to go beyond the distributive and procedural frameworks (Young, 1990). In environmen-
tal justice debates, justice as recognition considers forms of disrespect towards ethnic minorities 
and the socio-economically disadvantaged. It is often concerned with securing effective politi-
cal participation of all affected.
Empirical research and ethical evaluation
The environmental justice movement and environmental justice research are relatively young; 
both emerged only in the 1970s. One important landmark of their emergence was protests in 
Warren County in North Carolina against the siting of toxic waste in the predominantly black 
and low-income community (Johnson, 2009). During these protests, more than 500 protesters 
were arrested. Even though not successful, the protests gave rise to the formation of a nation-
wide movement against environmental injustices in the United States. Waste policy was an 
important issue at the beginning, but neither the political movement nor environmental justice 
research has been concerned purely with waste policy and waste facility siting: both have also 
investigated such issues as exposure to pollution, flooding risks, and more recently the adverse 
effects of climate change (Schlosberg, 2013). Nonetheless, unfair waste policy is still one of the 
main topics in empirical research on environmental justice. This research often finds a strong 
statistical correlation between unequal exposure to waste facilities and socio-economic disad-
vantage, which is commonly interpreted as an injustice (Agyeman et al., 2016). To interpret 
such a correlation as indicative of an injustice, however, it is necessary to be clear about what 
supports such an evaluation.
In the following, I first introduce the main indicators investigated by empirical environ-
mental justice research to determine an injustice in the statistical correlation between unequal 
exposure to waste facilities and socio-economic disadvantage. I argue that these indicators are 
insufficient to assess whether an injustice is at issue; they only indicate inequalities. In order 
for such inequalities to indicate injustices, it must be shown that exposure to waste facilities 
constitutes a normatively relevant disadvantage. Furthermore, socio-economic  disadvantage 
must be shown to increase risks in a normatively significant way. Finally, principles of jus-
tice are required as an ethical standard against which these inequalities can be assessed as 
injustices.
Inequality in exposure is defined by several indicators (Evans and Kantrowitz, 2002). The 
simplest is geographical proximity. The closer one lives to a waste facility, the more likely one 
is to be exposed to any threats it poses. Another indicator of this type concerns the nature of 
the facilities that individuals and communities may be exposed to. It makes a difference whether 
a waste facility is a recycling facility, an incinerator for non-hazardous or hazardous waste, a 
waste dump, or a repository for nuclear waste. The kind of facility one is exposed to affects 
the evaluation because the threats posed by the by-products of a facility determine the severity 
of the exposure. These threats may also be increased by the kind of waste being recycled or 
depolluted, which thus makes a difference for the assessment of exposure as well. The more 
dangerous the waste recycled or depolluted, the more severe is the exposure. A final important 
indicator is how long the waste will remain dangerous. Living near a nuclear waste repository 
is obviously more significant than living close to a bottle bank.
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Incorporating all these indicators leads to geographies of exposure, which map out inequali-
ties in exposure to waste facilities (Jerrett and Finkelstein, 2005). However, these geographies 
do not themselves display any injustices (Walker et al., 2007). They do so only if they display a 
normatively relevant disadvantage, such as risks for health or other potential harm due to expo-
sure to waste facilities. The nexus between proximity to waste facilities and health is perhaps 
the most prominent indicator of a normatively relevant disadvantage (Martuzzi et al., 2010). If 
the by-products of waste facilities like toxins and pollution increase health risks for those living 
nearby, then exposure to these facilities displays a normatively relevant disadvantage. Another 
normatively relevant disadvantage concerns the risk of accidental harm. Depending on the 
waste processed in a facility, such risk can range from contamination of water and land to the 
destruction or loss of valued assets. Other normatively relevant harmful by-products of waste 
facilities include increased noise and air pollution due to the operation of a facility or transporta-
tion of waste to or from facilities (Fernandez Rysavy and Floyd, 2016).
At the beginning of empirical environmental justice research in the United States, the strong 
statistical correlation between race and exposure to waste facilities led researchers to claim that 
in the US there is environmental racism (Bullard and Johnson, 2000). However, other studies 
argue that the broader category of socio-economic class rather than ethnicity is better suited to 
capturing these differences in disadvantage (Krieg and Faber, 2004). According to these studies, 
the relevant socio-economic differences concern education, social and cultural circumstances, 
and economic capacities rather than differences in ethnicity. While for the United States the 
relevance of ethnicity for environmental injustice is still debated (Bullard et al., 2008), in many 
European countries differences in ethnicity are less relevant. However, an important exception 
concerns the environmental discrimination of Roma communities (Harper et al., 2009).
Similarly to exposure itself, a strong statistical correlation between exposure to waste facili-
ties and socio-economic disadvantage must be shown to be problematic in a normatively rel-
evant sense as well. It must be shown why socio-economic disadvantage increases the risks 
related specifically to the exposure to waste facilities. This is why empirical environmental 
justice research often investigates not only the statistical correlation between socio-economic 
disadvantage and exposure but also how socio-economic disadvantage aggravates the negative 
side effects of waste facilities (Martuzzi et al., 2010).
One normatively relevant factor that aggravates risks arising from socio-economic disad-
vantage and exposure to waste facilities concerns social gradients in health (Brulle and Pellow, 
2006). Socio-economic disadvantage has been shown to be accompanied by increased vulner-
ability to ill health. For this reason, exposure to waste facilities that increases the risk of ill health 
is more problematic since it tends to exacerbate the vulnerability of those already at higher risk. 
Other normatively relevant circumstances aggravating risks concern economic capacity. Lower 
economic capacity diminishes the ability to insure valued assets against loss and damage as a 
consequence of the failure of waste facilities. Lower economic capacity also limits opportunities 
to move from a neighbourhood and thus binds the socio-economically disadvantaged to the 
place they already inhabit. Moreover, some empirical studies have shown that areas exposed 
to waste facilities tend to attract poorer people since waste facilities and their accompanying 
environmental drawbacks lower rents nearby (Pastor et al., 2001).
Taken together, social gradients in health and differences in economic capacity establish 
geographies of vulnerability that signal normatively relevant unequal distributions of aggra-
vated risks due to waste facilities. The highest environmental risks occur where geographies of 
exposure and geographies of vulnerability overlap. This is so because in these neighbourhoods 
the most vulnerable face the highest risks due to waste facilities. Mapping out these overlaps, 
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geographies of risk or ‘risk-scapes’ can be argued to display environmental injustices, since they 
indicate a geographically unfair unequal distribution of environmental risks (Morello-Frosch 
et al., 2011).
Whether such unequal distributions in fact signal injustices, however, depends on the nor-
mative principles employed for their evaluation. This is so for two reasons. First, the fact that 
the risks accompanying waste facilities are distributed unequally is not an injustice per se. There 
may be reasons that justify these inequalities. Second, if communities agree to have waste facili-
ties in their neighbourhood under the condition of being compensated for the increased risk, 
for example, this is a legitimate reason warranting a heavier exposure to environmental risks 
for these communities. These two reasons are the focal perspectives of the next two sections 
that follow.
Distributive justice and feasibility constraints
Empirical environmental justice research often considers cases of unequal burdening of disad-
vantaged social groups as instances of injustice. However, these inequalities do not necessarily 
display any injustice. For such a claim of injustice to be valid it must be shown that an unequal 
distribution of burdens conflicts with some principle of distributive justice (Schuppert and 
Wallimann-Helmer, 2014). In case of waste policy, principles of distributive justice define 
the conditions under which the geographical distribution of waste facilities in society can 
be deemed just. At least three principles of just outcome distribution may become relevant 
here (Watson and Bulkeley, 2007).1 First, the principle of equality demands that all members 
of society should be equally exposed to waste facilities. Second, the polluter-pays principle 
demands that exposure to waste facilities should be in proportion to the waste produced by 
individuals or communities. Third, the beneficiary-pays principle demands that exposure 
to waste facilities should correlate to the differing amount of benefits extracted from waste 
production.
In empirical environmental justice research, the most prominent principle is that of equality. 
According to this principle, waste facilities should be distributed equally across society (Walker, 
2012). A correlation between socio-economic disadvantage and the unequal geographic distri-
bution of waste facilities is often taken to be sufficient to claim an injustice. However, whether 
the distribution of waste facilities can indeed be deemed unjust depends not on their geographi-
cal distribution alone but on the distribution of the overall risk they engender. As argued earlier, 
an unequal geographical distribution of waste facilities is unjust only if the environmental risks 
are actually distributed in a way that aggravates normatively relevant disadvantage. This is espe-
cially the case if a distribution of waste facilities places a heavier burden on parts of society that 
are already more vulnerable due to increased health risks and lower economic capacity. Thus, it 
is more plausible to demand that the risks of exposure and vulnerability are distributed equally 
rather than the waste facilities themselves.
One common argument in defence of the principle of equality is the presumption of equal-
ity. According to this presumption, the default distribution when distributing goods and bur-
dens is equality (Gosepath, 2015). This is so because an equal distribution of goods and burdens 
is the only pattern of distribution which is not in need of justification. However, this presump-
tion can be questioned in the case of waste facilities. Our different lifestyles do not all produce 
equal amounts of waste, and we tend not to produce the same kinds of waste. Therefore, it 
seems more plausible to demand that environmental risks of waste facilities be distributed in 
accordance with the differing production of waste. This is where the polluter-pays principle 
comes in (Gardiner, 2004). According to the polluter-pays principle, a just distribution of waste 
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facilities is one that distributes them so that those producing the most and the most dangerous 
waste are those that face the greatest risks. Whereas the principle of equality seems to presume 
that the production of waste is equally or similarly distributed all over society, the polluter-pays 
principle takes inequalities in the production of waste as the starting point for defining a just 
outcome distribution of waste facilities.
The polluter-pays principle has some intuitive appeal. Most believe that those who pro-
duce a mess have the duty to tidy it up; in the case of waste, this means that they should 
accept the higher risks of depollution (Shue, 1999). However, waste often accumulates not 
only in the use of goods but also in their production. Consequently, those consuming the 
goods do not directly produce the waste. If understood this way, the polluter-pays principle 
can foster injustices, since the affluent are usually those who consume more goods but do not 
work in the production of these goods and thus do not directly produce the waste. The con-
sumers of goods often only benefit from others, who are most often the socio-economically 
disadvantaged, producing waste, as they create the goods that others subsequently consume. 
According to a third principle of distributive justice, the beneficiary-pays principle, it is 
therefore not those who produce the waste that should face higher environmental risks but 
those who benefit from the production of goods leading to waste (Page, 2008). The affluent 
consuming the most waste-intensive goods should be most exposed to waste facilities and 
their associated risks.
According to all three principles of distributive justice mentioned thus far, an unequal bur-
dening of the socio-economically disadvantaged seems to be unfair. Higher environmental 
risks due to an unequal distribution of waste facilities are deemed unfair either if the socio-
economically disadvantaged face unjustifiably higher risks than the affluent or if they face risks 
disproportionate to the waste they produce or the benefits they extract from waste produc-
tion. As plausible as these claims of injustice might seem at first sight, they can be challenged, 
because due to feasibility constraints a just outcome distribution of waste facilities is difficult if 
not impossible to achieve.
The most obvious of these constraints on feasibility are those of efficiency (Nakazawa, 2016). 
Logistically, it is simply more efficient to gather waste in a small number of facilities than to 
have many facilities in many neighbourhoods and backyards. Logistical reasons also justify siting 
waste facilities in regions that are easily accessible for waste transportation. Furthermore, large 
incineration plants and recycling facilities are better suited not only to processing larger amounts 
of waste more efficiently but also to ensuring better security for the surrounding neighbour-
hoods. Security and technical reasons are especially important in the cases of nuclear waste and 
other hazardous and toxic wastes (Krütli et al., 2015). The danger of contamination of land and 
water by these kinds of waste is very high, and storage is possible only under specific geological 
conditions. These considerations show that strict outcome justice in the distribution of waste 
facilities is difficult if not impossible to achieve. Consequently, it is necessary to consider how 
injustices in the distribution of waste facilities can be legitimised or made socially acceptable to 
those exposed to waste facilities.
Although efficiency, technical, and security reasons may become relevant, they must be 
weighed against considerations of outcome justice and vulnerability, since they take into 
account neither the distribution of overall environmental risks nor the differences in producing 
waste or in benefiting from waste. Thus, communities living in geographical regions that allow 
more efficient waste depollution or more secure and technically more feasible storage of waste 
cannot simply be said to be better able to accept waste facilities. Such claims would amount to 
another principle of justice, the ability-to-pay principle (Caney, 2010). However, this principle 
seems to be implausible in the case of waste facility siting.
Review Copy – Not for Redistribution - 06/12/2018 




Risk and the importance of procedural justice
From the previous section, it appears that due to efficiency, technical, and security reasons it 
is highly probable that a just outcome distribution of the risks from waste facilities cannot be 
achieved, at least not in the foreseeable future. Two further considerations of justice can correct 
this kind of injustice – that is, they can legitimise and increase the social acceptability of such 
unjust siting: procedural justice and compensatory justice. Procedural justice, to wit democratic 
participation in policy decisions about waste facility siting, could help legitimise the unequal 
burdening of certain parts of society. Compensating the neighbourhoods of waste facilities 
would allow the unjust distribution of overall environmental risks due to waste facilities to be 
rectified. In the following, I argue that procedural justice must be guaranteed not only in policy 
decisions about the siting of waste facilities but also in decisions about what kind of compensa-
tion is just for increased environmental risks.
Empirical environmental justice research not only detects injustices in the outcome distri-
bution of waste facilities. In many cases, it also finds that the communities exposed to waste 
facilities have not been properly involved in the political processes leading to their siting. For 
instance, it has been shown that in Eastwick only after the socio-economically disadvantaged 
gained influence in policy decisions more just results in land-use could have been reached 
(Sicotte, 2010). Before that, land-use decisions discriminated against local residents in favour of 
industry displacing many residents from their homes. Coordinated protests by locals allowed for 
more influence in these decisions leading to the abandonment of several waste disposal facilities, 
including facilities for nuclear and hazardous waste.
The lack of involving those potentially affected by waste facilities in policy decisions is 
problematic for at least three reasons. First, failing to appropriately involve those affected means 
discriminating against their interests unjustifiably. According to the all-affected principle, it is 
illegitimate to deny a voice in policy decisions to those who have an interest at stake (Goodin, 
2007). Second, it is unacceptable to expose others to risks if they have not had the possibil-
ity to consent (Hansson, 2013). This is especially important when more hazardous risks are at 
stake because the potential harm is more severe. Third, there is an empirical argument why 
democratic involvement is important: social-psychological justice research on nuclear waste 
repository siting in Switzerland has shown that transparency and involvement of those affected 
can substantially increase social acceptance (Krütli et al., 2015).
These three arguments indicate three conditions of procedural justice applicable to policy 
decisions about the siting of waste facilities. Firstly, according to the all-affected principle, all 
those exposed to waste facilities should be involved. Secondly, it is important to secure appro-
priate scientific information for all affected since it is only those affected who can decide how to 
evaluate the risks they face (Wallimann-Helmer, 2016). Thirdly, to increase the social accept-
ance of siting decisions, it is important to make the rules for decision-making as transparent and 
as inclusive as possible. Taken together, these three conditions can be said to define the core of 
what it means to ensure procedural justice in waste facility siting but also in many other occa-
sions in which the increased imposition of environmental risks is at issue.
In fact, many waste facilities have been sited without ensuring appropriate democratic 
involvement of those affected, and in many protests relevant for the formation of the envi-
ronmental justice movement claims for more involvement in policy decisions were part of 
the campaigning (Johnson, 2009). In these kinds of cases, communities were often faced 
with increased risks to their health or damage to and loss of valued assets. To remedy such 
injustice, compensation seems to be the most appropriate course of action. Those facing 
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increased environmental risks of waste facilities must find themselves in circumstances as if 
the increased environmental risk had never occurred. Similarly, given appropriate demo-
cratic involvement in siting decisions, those potentially facing increased risks due to the 
future siting of waste facilities will most probably demand some kind of compensation for 
the fact that they will be burdened more heavily with environmental risks. However, what 
compensation is appropriate in these kinds of cases is not as straightforward as it might seem 
(O’Neill, 2017). It depends not only on how the environmental risks can be determined 
empirically but also on the individual assessment of those facing these risks. This is for the 
following reasons.
Generally speaking, the goal of compensation should be that those affected subjectively 
feel as well off as before they were injured (O’Neill, 1987). The meaning of this claim is most 
straightforward in cases of monetisable harm. If someone is harmed and must be compensated, 
then it is appropriate that that person receives enough money to be able to pursue the same 
ends as before. In Goodin’s words, this is means-replacing compensation (Goodin, 1989). In 
this case, money allows the means damaged or lost to be repaired or replaced. However, not all 
harm is monetisable, and it is not even clear in all cases of monetisable harm what amount of 
money makes good for the damaged or lost assets. And in some cases, the assets lost cannot be 
replaced at all. The ends usually realised by these assets must be modified. According to Goodin, 
this demands another kind of compensation: ends-displacement compensation (e.g., assistance 
in changing livelihood due to contaminated agricultural land).
This distinction between two kinds of compensation is especially important if waste facili-
ties increase health risks or other risks of harm not readily monetisable. It is not straightforward 
what amount of money makes good for bad health or an increased risk thereof. It is difficult 
to say what amount of money appropriately compensates for the loss of livelihood due to, for 
instance, contamination of agricultural land. In these kinds of cases, it might be better not even 
to try to replace means but to compensate by helping those affected to change their valued 
objectives. That is, the best goal of compensation might be assisting in modifying ends so that 
those being compensated no longer depend on the means damaged or lost to feel subjectively 
as well off as before.2
These considerations show why involvement of legitimate claimants for compensation in 
policy decisions is key. They should not only assess the tolerability of the  environmental risks 
they face but also determine what compensatory measures are most appropriate and, in order 
to avoid paternalism, in what way they want to modify their valued objectives. Admittedly, 
democratic involvement of all affected cannot outweigh an unjust outcome distribution of 
waste facilities, even if accompanied by appropriate compensation. At best, it can legitimise an 
unjust distribution of waste facilities and, if fair and transparent decision procedures are applied, 
increase the social acceptability of a facility in a neighbourhood. However, since efficiency, tech-
nical, and security reasons render a just outcome distribution unfeasible, in many cases this will 
be the best approximation to justice reachable.
But, as discussed previously, higher socio-economic vulnerability tends to reinforce envi-
ronmental risks from waste facilities. Therefore, procedural justice and appropriate compensa-
tion seem to be especially important in these cases. Since members of vulnerable communities 
tend to be less well educated, capacity building in these neighbourhoods becomes particularly 
important. Only under conditions of adequate capacity can members of vulnerable communi-
ties appropriately influence the policy decisions to be taken, whether it is about the siting of 
waste facilities or about compensating for increased environmental risks. This is one of the 
issues that concerns justice as recognition, to which we now turn.
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Recognition, citizenship, and inclusion
Following the argument thus far, unequal exposure of parts of society to the higher environ-
mental risks of waste facilities can become acceptable if all affected have been appropriately 
involved in policy decisions, in deciding either about the siting of waste facilities or about the 
compensation for increased risks. This condition demands that those affected can have an effec-
tive voice in the decisions concerning waste facilities. Too much socio-economic inequality 
undermines this condition, because voicing one’s beliefs about increased environmental risks 
demands at least some basic social and economic capacities. However, social and economic 
capacities for information gathering and campaigning tend to be significantly lower for the 
socio-economically disadvantaged than for the affluent. Consequently, to ensure an effective 
voice for all affected it becomes necessary to reduce socio-economic inequalities.
This requirement to reduce socio-economic inequalities incorporates one of the two issues 
I discuss in this section. The first issue concerns the conditions of effective and equal voice in 
policy decisions about waste facilities. I argue that, depending on how these conditions are 
defined, not only must socio-economic inequalities be reduced to a greater or lesser extent, 
but also the inequalities that are acceptable in the distribution of environmental risks vary. The 
second issue is the appropriate extension of the decision-making body. This is the question of 
who should be involved in policy decisions related to waste facilities and their siting. While at 
first sight, these challenges might seem clearly distinct from each other, they are usually dis-
cussed in environmental justice research as part of the third category of justice mentioned at the 
beginning: justice as recognition. Among other things, appropriate recognition means granting 
all those affected by waste facilities an effective voice in the policy process leading to their siting 
or to agreements on compensatory measures for increased environmental risks (Walker, 2009).
Many different approaches could be deemed relevant to evaluating the requirements for 
appropriate recognition of those affected by the siting of waste facilities. What I take to be a 
promising approach is to look at different understandings of democratic citizenship through the 
lens of justice (Schuppert and Wallimann-Helmer, 2014). This lens makes it possible to show 
why it depends on our understandings of democracy and citizenship that more or less deviation 
from a just outcome distribution in waste policy is acceptable. We can think of democratic citi-
zenship as a formal or a substantial requirement of justice.3 Formal and substantial requirements 
demand different conditions for citizens to secure effective and equal voice in policy decisions. 
In doing so, they demand more or less extensive reduction of socio-economic inequalities. It is 
this demand that defines the space for unequal yet legitimate distributions of waste facilities and 
accompanying environmental risks.
According to the formal requirement, citizenship is defined by the formal and legal rights 
every citizen enjoys (Downs, 1957). These include the right to vote, the right to life, and all 
other rights usually considered basic rights. Following this account, once formal rights to vote 
have been given, any policy decision is acceptable if it does not undermine these basic rights. 
This means that policy decisions about the siting of waste facilities and potential compensatory 
claims are acceptable as long as all citizens affected had a formal right to participate in the pro-
cesses leading to these decisions. This account faces two challenges. First, the socio-economic 
inequalities between the parties involved in policy decisions need not be counterbalanced. 
Although these inequalities most probably increase the unfairness in waste policy decisions, 
according to the formal requirement of citizenship the right to vote is enough to ensure legiti-
mate decisions. Second, under the condition that the resulting policy does not infringe upon 
basic rights, it is deemed acceptable irrespective of how bad the consequences are for those 
exposed and most vulnerable to environmental risks.
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The substantial requirement of citizenship can remedy these unfavourable implications by 
demanding that policy decisions are acceptable only if citizens are substantially equal in their 
powers during policy-making and remain so thereafter. According to this account, unequal 
distributions of waste facilities and associated risks would be acceptable only to the extent that 
they do not undermine substantial conditions of justice (Van Parijs, 2011). However, while the 
formal requirement leaves great leeway for inequalities, such a stringent substantial requirement 
is far too demanding. It claims that policy decisions are acceptable only if they are in line with 
comprehensive conditions of outcome justice. In the case of the siting of waste facilities, their 
unequal geographical distribution would be acceptable only if their associated environmental 
risks could be distributed according to principles of distributive justice. As argued earlier, how-
ever, efficiency, technical, and security considerations render this infeasible. Therefore, for the 
siting of waste facilities to be possible the substantial requirement of citizenship should not be 
interpreted too restrictively.
What seems to be needed is a middle-ground position that incorporates both requirements of 
citizenship. One version of this position could be called the social-egalitarian account (Anderson, 
1999). It allows for inequalities in the siting of waste facilities and associated risks but demands 
that, to be fair, policyprocedures presuppose substantial conditions of free and equal citizenship. 
These conditions should not be undermined by any inequalities resulting from the siting of waste 
facilities. If these conditions are not undermined, any inequalities in the distribution of environ-
mental risks resulting from appropriate decision procedures are acceptable. I take this conception 
of citizenship to be attractive because it secures at least some basic substantial equality between 
citizens while leaving enough space for acceptable policy decisions not fully aligned with the 
principles of just outcome distribution (Schuppert and Wallimann-Helmer, 2014).
But, just as with any other account of citizenship, it remains silent about the second 
challenge of inclusion mentioned before. The question about the appropriate extension of the 
 decision-making body incorporates two aspects. First, exposure to waste facilities and vulner-
ability to their associated environmental risks are not restricted to the boundaries of a jurisdic-
tion or a state. Second, risks from waste facilities do not exclusively concern those living at the 
time of policy decisions about waste facilities; generations living far in the future are affected 
too (e.g., in the case of nuclear waste this is thousands of years). The first aspect deals with the 
relevance of geographical proximity to waste facilities and how to recognise interests beyond 
the boundaries of given jurisdictions and states. The second aspect concerns the inclusion of 
future generations in the policy decisions of those living today. Similarly to the geographical 
challenge of inclusion, the interests of future generations tend to be ignored by those actually 
involved in policy decisions today. Consequently, both aspects of inclusion investigate whether 
the policy-making body should be expanded, and if so how.
The geographical challenge of inclusion may plausibly be answered by involving all those 
geographically exposed to the consequences of policy-making irrespective of boundaries (Val-
entini, 2012). However, although not so difficult to imagine, such a solution is quite unusual 
for states as we know them today, because their boundaries of jurisdiction usually remain stable 
and do not vary depending on the policy issue. The lack of inclusion of future generations can-
not be overcome by varying the decision-making body as currently constituted. What would 
be needed for their inclusion is some kind of proxy representation in the policy-making process 
and corresponding changes in institutional structures (Wallimann-Helmer et al., 2016).
However, in most countries, institutional change for both challenges of inclusion as envis-
aged here needs more time than is available to deal smoothly with pressing policy issues like 
the siting of waste facilities. As a consequence, those deciding about the siting of waste facilities 
and probable compensatory measures should be ready to recognise that the people potentially 
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vulnerable to these facilities are not only those officially involved in the decision-making pro-
cess but also born or unborn others beyond the jurisdiction or the state concerned.
Conclusion
In this essay I argued that the ethics of waste policy mainly concerns three different kinds of 
justice considerations. First, it concerns the just geographical distribution of environmental risks 
from waste facilities. Second, the fair procedural involvement of all those potentially affected is 
key because due to efficiency, technical, and security reasons waste facilities cannot be distrib-
uted in a way fully corresponding with principles of outcome justice. Third, recognition of all 
those potentially affected by waste facilities, either to be involved in the decision-making pro-
cess on fair terms or being legitimate claimants of compensation, demands securing an effective 
voice and careful consideration about the extension of the decision-making body. However, to 
assess whether inequalities in exposure and vulnerability can be deemed injustices, it is necessary 
to clarify whether they are normatively significant.4
Notes
 1 Proponents of the environmental justice movement and empirical environmental justice researchers are 
often not very explicit about the principles they invoke to warrant injustices in the distribution of waste 
facilities. This differs from the debate about climate justice in which the principles discussed here are 
more prominent (Gardiner et al., 2010).
 2 This reasoning faces at least two challenges I cannot comprehensively discuss here. First, assisting people 
to modify their ends readily tends to be overly paternalistic, since helping changing ends involves direc-
tives from those who assist. This is one important reason why I believe that regarding compensatory 
issues procedural justice is of key importance. Second, the costs of monetisable compensation are clearly 
restricted by the amount of money lost. In the case of revising ends, the limit for resources to be spent 
on assistance is not as clear-cut as in the first case. Here letting only those affected decide about the 
compensatory measures to be taken might be more problematic.
 3 In political theory, the distinction between liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship is com-
mon. I use the distinction between formal and substantial requirements of citizenship because I believe 
that the social-egalitarian account I favour cannot be captured by distinguishing between liberal and 
republican accounts of citizenship only.
 4 I would like to thank Leandra Bräuninger, Annabelle Lever, Simon Milligan, Andrei Poama, Fabian 
Schuppert, Stefan Wallaschek, and participants of the Colloquium “Politische Philosophie” in Zurich 
for comments and feedback on early and earliest versions of this essay.
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